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Abstract Drawing from the resource-based view and
transaction costs economics, we develop a theoretical
framework to explain why small and large firms face
different levels of resource access needs and resource
access capabilities, which mediate the relationship
between firm size and hybrid governance. Employing a
sample of 317 venture capital firms, drawn across six
European countries, we empirically assess our frame-
work in the context of venture capital syndication.
We estimate a path model using structural equation
modeling and find, consistent with our theoretical
framework, mediating effects of different types of
resource access needs and resource access capabilities
between VC firm size and syndication frequency.
These findings advance the small business literature by
highlighting the trade-offs that size imposes on firms
that seek to manage their access to external resources
through hybrid governance strategies.
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1 Introduction
Large size gives a firm advantages relating to the
greater availability of financial resources, organiza-
tional routines, and capabilities (Bercovitz and
Mitchell 2007). Small firms can try to mitigate these
resource disadvantages by gaining access to external
resources through hybrid governance (Dyer and
Singh 1998). Empirical studies have shown that
small firms with limited resources benefit more from
partnerships than their more affluent partners, even
when controlling for firm age (Stuart 2000). How-
ever, large firms with more central network positions
and alliance experience are posited to be more
valuable alliance partners (Williamson 1985; Podolny
1994; Nooteboom et al. 1997; Stuart 2000). These
valuable network-based assets of large firms increase
the need to protect them, particularly when they
consider exchange with small and unfamiliar firms.
This addresses an important strategic dilemma that is
neglected in the strategic management literature:
small firms have a higher need to gain access to
external resources through collaborative structures,
but at the same time are also less attractive partners,
which impedes an optimal access to external
resources through hybrid governance.
The aim of this paper is to examine how firm size
affects hybrid governance. The role of firm size in
hybrid governance structures has received little
attention in the literature and has been theoretically
ill-defined. Building on the extended resource-based
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view that focuses on access to resources rather than
control of resources and integrates the resource-based
view with arguments from transaction costs econom-
ics (Lavie 2006), we develop a theoretical framework
to explain why small and large firms face different
levels of resource access needs and resource access
capabilities, which differentiate their hybrid gover-
nance strategies.
To demonstrate and empirically validate our
framework we use the context of Venture Capital
(VC) syndication. VC syndication involves two or
more VC firms taking an equity stake in an invest-
ment, either in the same round or at different points in
time (Brander et al. 2002). The decision to syndicate
an investment is not trivial: there are both substantial
advantages and disadvantages. Resource-based the-
ory emphasizes syndication as a means to gain access
to greater resources. For example, syndication may
allow VC firms to gain access to larger funds,
improve and enlarge their set of investment selection,
monitoring and value-adding routines, or improve
deal-flow generated through reciprocation by syndi-
cate members (e.g., Bygrave 1987; Manigart et al.
2006). On the other hand, VC firms may be less
motivated to syndicate transactions if they believe
that the advantages of syndication are offset by the
increased risks or costs. Hybrid governance arrange-
ments, such as VC syndication, may require more
coordination and may be less adaptive than non-
syndicated investments (Williamson 1991). Further,
syndication partners may have different interests,
which may bring about greater chances of conflicts
(Wright and Lockett 2003). Finally, what makes the
context of the VC industry particularly interesting is
the vital role of networks, making network-based
assets an important factor in VC syndication
decisions.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. First, we
explain how VC firm size affects the need and the
capability for syndication, by advancing theoretical
explanations for syndication that involve the need
and the capability to gain access to complementary
resources through hybrid governance. Second, we
describe the data and outline our empirical methods.
Third, we present the results of our analysis. Consis-
tent with our framework, we find that resource access
needs and resources access capabilities mediate the
relationship between VC firm size and syndication
frequency, and when these different mediating effects
are taken into account, no simple relationship
between firm size and VC syndication frequency
can be assumed. Finally, we conclude with a
discussion of the results, the limitations of the study,
and provide directions for a further research on firm
size and hybrid governance strategies.
2 Firm size and VC syndicated investment
2.1 Resource access and syndicated investment
The resource-based view distinguishes itself from
other approaches by taking the firm’s individual
resources as the unit of analysis. The resources of the
firm enable the generation of Ricardian rents and/or
quasi-rents (Conner 1991; Peteraf 1993). Ricardian
rents—which are generated by scarce or inelastic
resources—do not depend on the presence of other
resources and therefore are unaffected by the total size
of a firm’s resource endowments (Mosakowski 2002).
Quasi-rents exist when the best use of a particular
resource requires the presence of another resource
because of the complementary nature of the relation-
ship between the resources. For example, a firm may
create value from complementary resources by gener-
ating synergies, enhancing internal resources, and
making available a wider range of opportunities
available (Lavie 2007). If complementary resources
are not equally available to all firms, resources can only
be used within the firm in its second best use. As small
firms have a smaller scale and scope of resources
available (Bercovitz and Mitchell 2007), they can have
a disadvantage in generating rents from internal
complementary resources. Small firms can try to
mitigate these internal resource disadvantages by
gaining access to external resources through hybrid
governance structures, such as syndicated VC
investment.
The traditional resource-based view focused only
on the intra-firm complementarities because it
assumed ownership or at least control of resources as
a necessary condition for appropriating rents. In the
relational or extended resource-based view, this
assumption is relaxed to the weaker condition of
resource accessibility, which refers to the right to
utilize and employ resources or enjoy their associated
rents (Lavie 2006). A fundamental question addressed
in our paper is how firm size will influence the access to
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external resources through hybrid governance arrange-
ments. We argue that in order to unravel this complex
relationship, we need to distinguish between the need
and the capability to gain access to external resources
through hybrid governance. Small firms have limited
in-house resources and hence are more dependent on
accessing resources from external parties in order to
create respectively value from new resource combina-
tions (Dyer and Singh 1998), a wider range of strategic
opportunities (Barney 1991), and accumulation of
knowledge and skills (Kogut 2000). However, previ-
ous studies indicated that large (Stuart 2000) and
reputable (Gulati and Higgins 2003) firms are the most
valuable partners in hybrid governance settings, and
therefore small firms may be less capable to partner
with other firms. Hence, the need and the capability for
accessing resources are diametrically opposing poten-
tial explanations of the firm size and syndication
frequency relationship.
Previous studies identified four critical factors for
syndication in the VC industry: access to financial
resources, access to management resources and deal-
flow reciprocation (Lockett and Wright 2001; Man-
igart et al. 2006), and adaptive coordination
efficiency (Wright and Lockett 2003; Cumming
2006). The first two factors relate to the need for
access to resources by syndication, whereas the latter
two relate to the capabilities to syndicate. We expand
our arguments below.
2.2 Firm size and resource access needs
2.2.1 Access to financial resources
Syndication facilitates access to financial resources
from other VCs, thus enabling larger investments and
diversification of the VC firm’s investment portfolio
across a wider range of industry sectors (Zacharakis
2002). De Clerq and Dimov (2004) found support for
a financial resource-sharing rationale for syndication
among 200 US-based VC firms over a 12-year period.
Lockett and Wright (2001) and Manigart et al. (2006)
further showed that the dominant motive for Euro-
pean VC firms to syndicate their deals is gaining
access to financial capital through sharing financial
resources.
From the perspective of financial resources, large
VC firms have fewer incentives to syndicate (Manigart
et al. 2006) as their size means that they have more
access to internal financial resources and can create
larger portfolios within which it is easier to diversify
risk. Diversification is particularly difficult to achieve
in VC investment because of the high threshold costs of
setting-up a relationship with the investee (Lockett and
Wright 2001). Evidence suggests that smaller VC
funds indeed find it more difficult to achieve optimal
diversification (Huntsman and Hoben 1980; Murray
1999). Thus, we expect that VC firm size will be
negatively related to the need to gain access to financial
resources through syndication.
H1: VC firm size is negatively related to the need
to gain access to financial resources through
syndicated VC investment.
2.2.2 Access to management resources
An important non-financial resource for a VC firm is
the management expertise to select and monitor
investments effectively and facilitate value creation
by the investee company (Lockett and Wright 2001).
The need to gain access to specific management
expertise through syndication may particularly be
important if VC firms try to expand their industry
sector, investment stage, or geographical scope outside
their normal range of investment activities (Sorenson
and Stuart 2001). Syndication may provide access to
the superior expertise of other VC firms, thereby
improving the quality of selection and post-investment
value adding and monitoring (Sapienza et al. 1996;
Wright and Lockett 2003). Several studies support this
access to management resources argument as a motive
to syndicate (e.g., Sorenson and Stuart 2001).
The management resources of a VC firm are likely
to be constrained by the scale and scope of its activities
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Bercovitz and
Mitchell 2007). The larger the VC team of executives,
the more likely it is that the VC firm will hire specialists
that devote their time entirely to investments in specific
regions, industry sectors, or investment stages. Large
VC firms are less likely to need additional management
expertise outside their scope of operations. Therefore,
we expect that VC firm size will be negatively related
to the need to gain access to management expertise
through syndicated investment.
H2: VC firm size is negatively related to the need
to gain access to management resources through
syndicated VC investment.
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2.3 Firm size and resource access capabilities
2.3.1 Deal-flow reciprocation
VC firms are unlikely to identify interesting oppor-
tunities outside their natural investment area
(Sorenson and Stuart 2001). Syndication allows VC
firms to do so by using inter-firm networks across
geographic and industry boundaries (Manigart et al.
1994; Sorenson and Stuart 2001). Syndicating a deal
may create an expectation to reciprocate the gesture
in the future (Lockett and Wright 2001).
Large VCs are more attractive syndication partners
because of their status (Stuart 2000), central network
position (Podolny 1994) and larger scale and scope of
operations. Large VC firms are therefore more likely
to be invited into future deals. Previous research
(Manigart et al. 2006) reported that deal-flow recip-
rocation is more important for larger early stage VCs
than for smaller early stage VCs. Syndication may
also improve the status, central network position, and
range of activities of VC firms, and large firms may
have the need to maintain and improve these firm
resources and capabilities. However, small firms also
have good reasons to improve these resources and
capabilities (Hochberg et al. 2007). What differenti-
ates large and small VC firms is that small VC firms
are less likely to be invited in future deals, and
therefore their capability for deal-flow reciprocation
is less effective. Therefore, we expect that deal-flow
reciprocation will be positively related to VC firm
size.
H3: VC firm size is positively related to deal-flow
reciprocation through syndicated VC investment.
2.3.2 Adaptive coordination efficiency
According to transaction cost economics (TCE), a
fundamental problem of organizations is how to cope
efficiently with an unpredictable environment when
organizing transactions (Williamson 1999). Firms will
prefer those governance forms that by approximation
have the highest level of comparative adaptive coor-
dination efficiency to unexpected future contingencies.
VC firms can choose to bring resources under their own
control and execute the transaction under ‘‘hierarchical
governance’’ or achieve access to resources through
‘‘hybrid governance,’’ such as VC syndicates, where
external resources become available to the syndicate
partners without the formal transfer of ownership. A
crucial assumption of TCE is that hierarchies are more
efficient in adaptive coordination compared to hybrid
governance arrangements (Williamson 1991), and so
contracts within firms can be more incomplete than
between firms. A capability can be defined as the
ability to perform a particular task or activity (Helfat
et al. 2007), and TCE’s claim that hierarchical
governance is more efficient in performing adaptive
coordination tasks or activities is based on five
coordination capability advantages (Williamson
1991, p. 280):
(1) Proposals to adapt require less documentation;
(2) Resolving internal disputes by fiat rather than
arbitration saves resources and facilitates timely
adaptation;
(3) Information can more easily be accessed and
more accurately assessed;
(4) Internal dispute resolution enjoys the support of
informal organization;
(5) Internal organization has access to additional
incentive instruments that promote team
orientation.
The comparative efficiency of hierarchical adap-
tive coordination may particularly apply in the context
of the transfer of tacit knowledge and higher order
routines. Examples in the literature are non-tradability
of knowledge assets (Kogut and Zander 1992) and the
more efficient utilization of tacit knowledge (Conner
and Prahalad 1996). In addition, Williamson (1996)
refers to the high costs of writing explicit contracts
over knowledge routines compared to the continuous
association between employee and manager. Hierar-
chical governance can efficiently enforce implicit
elements of contracts, using the internal norms and
conventions that emerge from continued interaction
among employees. Overall, TCE as well as knowl-
edge-based theory provide strong arguments that
knowledge exchange within firm boundaries is more
efficient than between firm boundaries. Empirical
evidence of adaptive coordination inefficiency in
syndicated investment is reported by Cumming
(2006) and Wright and Lockett (2003). Cumming
(2006) reports that syndication reduces portfolio size
per manager and explains this effect by arguing that
each VC firm manager must monitor other syndicated
VC investors in addition to the portfolio companies.
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Wright and Lockett (2003) found that agreement on
coordinated action and decision-making in the syndi-
cate took longer than in non-syndicated investment.
The question that needs to be addressed in the
present study is why firm size would influence the
relative adaptive coordination efficiency of firms.
Large VC firms with more specialized and experienced
executive teams will attract more funds (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven 1996), negotiate better deals (Hsu
2004) and have better access to capital (Laine and
Torstila 2005). However, large firms owe such scale
advantages to a complex system of repetitive and
specialized routines (Barney 1997; Dobrev and Carroll
2003, p. 542). Any change in the system of routines
requires successive steps in the organizational hierar-
chy until a common level of supervision is reached.
This requires more time and in addition will be less
effective because with each additional layer of hierar-
chical coordination, there may be considerable risks of
distortion of information (Williamson 1967). Small
VC firms, on the other hand, can operate with less
complicated bureaucratic structures (Chen and Ham-
brick 1995; Forbes and Milliken 1999) with fewer
decision-makers (Das and Husain 1993). Further, they
can operate with fewer formal systems and procedures
in place and perform fewer planning activities (Buse-
nitz and Barney 1997). Less restrained by structural
inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and endowed with
greater decision speed, smaller VC firms can adapt
more efficiently than larger VC firms to unexpected
future contingencies.
Furthermore, large firms have more exposure
through public information (Nooteboom et al.
1997), and given the high visibility of the investment
behavior of large VC firms due to their central
network position and their higher exposure in the
economy (Podolny 1994), large VC firms in partic-
ular are constrained by the risks of opportunistic
behavior or bounded rationality of syndication part-
ners, and need to invest more in extensive screening
and monitoring (Stuart 2000) or limit their potential
syndication partners to other prominent VCs (Lerner
1994; Stuart et al. 1999) or to known partners (Stuart
2000). In addition, because such measures are
imperfect (Williamson 1985, p. 112), large firms will
syndicate less, so as not to be exposed to potential
syndication risks or face higher costs resulting from
adaptation to (potential) coordination problems and
conflicts. Thus, if the business environment is
complex and uncertain—such as in the VC indus-
try—we expect that the adaptive coordination
efficiency of the focal firm in hybrid governance
forms such as syndicated investment to be negatively
related with firm size.
H4: VC firm size of the focal firm is negatively
related to the adaptive coordination efficiency of a
syndicated VC investment.
2.4 Control variables
We include several potentially size-related variables
that may explain syndication frequency. First, in
general early stage deals are more complex and
uncertain than later stage deals (Sapienza et al.
1996); this may impact transaction costs and hence
syndication frequency. Hence, we included investment
stage as control variable. Second, large firms with their
alliance experience and central network positions may
be more likely to lead VC syndicates than small VC
firms. We therefore included lead syndication as a
control variable. The management of the investment is
delegated to the lead investor, which increases the
workload of the lead investor, but may reduce the risks
of the lead investor. Further, we included firm age as a
control variable. VC firm contacts, experience, and
status are likely to grow with its age, and young VC
firms may have a higher propensity to opportunistically
strive towards successful exits (Ja¨a¨skela¨inen et al.
2006). Thus, many of the effects of firm size may be
confounded with the effects of firm age, and we need to
control for these effects.
In Fig. 1, we summarize the model with the four
hypothesized relationships, the control variables and
the relationships with syndication frequency. In
addition to the indirect effects of VC firm size, we
also include the direct effects of firm size to control
for direct effects of firm size on syndication fre-
quency. Next, we discuss the data and the methods
used to test the proposed theoretical framework.
3 Methods
We tested the above framework on a dataset of 317
European VC firms. The data were gathered using a
pre-tested mail survey. The questionnaire was devel-
oped in three phases. The first stage in the process
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was the development of a questionnaire based on
available literature (Lockett and Wright 2001; Man-
igart et al. 2006). The questionnaire was piloted in six
interviews with a range of executives in VC firms
involved in different stages of venture capital invest-
ment. We administered the questionnaire in six
European countries, ranging from Northern Europe
(UK, Sweden) to central countries such as France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The sample,
therefore, includes countries in different parts of
Europe, where the VC industry is long established
and industry practices have matured (Manigart et al.
2006).
The questionnaires were translated into French and
Dutch in order to be used in France and Belgium. The
questionnaire was administered by post to the head
offices of all 106 VC firms in the UK, identified using
the British Venture Capital Association handbook and
CMBOR (Center for Management Buy-out Research)
records. In Belgium, data were collected by sending a
questionnaire to 79 VC firms, identified using the
membership list of the Belgian Venturing Association
and the European Venture Capital Association. In
France, data were collected by sending out 120
questionnaires to the full members of the ‘Association
Franc¸aise des Investisseurs en Capital Risque.’ In
Sweden the questionnaires were sent to the 169
members of the Swedish Venture Capital Association
and the VC members of the Swedish National Board of
Technical and Industrial Development. In Germany
and the Netherlands, the untranslated questionnaire
was sent to the 191 members of the EVCA and 50
members of the Dutch Venture Capitalist Association.
In all countries, a follow-up was done either by
sending reminders or by calling the VC firms after
1–2 months.
The total sample consists of 317 usable responses
(44% response rate) from the six European countries
(63 UK, 66 Sweden, 49 France, 68 Germany, 29 the
Netherlands, and 42 Belgium). As response rates and
participation in syndication networks might be
related, non-response bias of the sample was tested
using the test of Armstrong and Overton (1977), and
no significant deviation was found. In addition, the
representativeness of the sample was tested for each
country separately using firm-specific characteristics
(minimum investment preference, maximum invest-
ment preference, and the number of staff members)
available from the national and European VC direc-
tories. No significant differences were found between
respondents and non-respondents in Belgium, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands. In Sweden and the
UK, the respondents’ maximum investment prefer-
ence is significantly (5% confidence level) larger than
that of non-respondents. This indicates that using
several variables the sample is generally representa-
tive for the VC firm industry in all countries of the
study, with the exception of maximum investment
preference for Sweden and the UK.
3.1 Measures
3.1.1 Syndication frequency
To examine the empirical relationship between VC
firm size and syndication frequency, we measure
syndication activity in five categories: 0%–20%,
21%–40%, 41%–60%, 61%–80%, or 81%–100% of
the total portfolio that is syndicated (measured in
number of deals). The median VC firm in the sample
has syndicated frequency between 41% and 60% of
the deals in its portfolio (category 3).
3.1.2 VC firm size
Various options are available to measure firm size,
such as the number of executives, the number of VC
firm investments, or the funds under management
(Cumming 2006). We have chosen the number of VC
Fig. 1 The structural equation model used to test the
mediation role of the resources access needs and capabilities
on the VC firm size and syndication frequency relationship
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firm executives and the size of the funds under
management as our size measures. Theoretically,
both size measures are linked with each other. Large
teams of VC executives are more likely to be
specialized and therefore have better access to
management resources. In addition, large teams are
likely to have more status than small ones (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven 1996) and therefore are more likely
to have large funds under management. We did not
combine the two measures in one model because of
potential problems of multicollinearity. We log-
transformed the size variables in our analysis, which
reflects the idea that size has diminishing marginal
effects. The rationale for the diminishing marginal
effects for size is that we expect that relative changes
are more meaningful than absolute changes in these
variables. The effect of an increase in a VC firm’s
number of executives with 10 employees might be
substantial for a firm with 5 employees, while it will
only be small for a firm with 500 employees. A
change in a VC firm’s number of executives with
10% might have a similar effect for both small and
large VC firms.1
3.1.3 Resource access needs and capabilities.
We included scale items in the survey questionnaire
to measure the degree to which different resource
access needs and capabilities (see Table 1) were
important in the decision to syndicate; these related to
management, finance, and deal-flow reciprocation.
[Survey question: How important are the following
factors in influencing your decision to syndicate
deals? (Please rate from 1 to 5, 1 = very important;
5 = very unimportant)].
3.1.4 Adaptive coordination efficiency
Empirical research on transaction costs economics
almost never attempts to measure such costs directly,
but instead uses indirect measures of transaction
costs. Such indirect measures are asset specificity,
frequency, and uncertainty (Williamson 1985). A risk
of such indirect measures is that they can also be
compatible with alternative explanations (Carter and
Hodgson 2006). In this study we aim to measure
transaction costs directly using the survey question-
naire scale items listed in Table 1. The theoretical
foundation of our measure is the assessment of TCE
that hierarchical arrangements have more efficient
adaptive coordination capabilities as compared to
hybrid governance arrangements (Williamson 1991).
Compared to hybrid governance, coordination by
hierarchical governance facilitates timely and effi-
cient adaptation through lower information costs,
dispute settlement, decision-making, and incentive
systems (Williamson 1991). We do not include all
(absolute) transaction costs of adaptive coordination
because transaction costs economics is only inter-
ested in the comparative assessment of the costs
differences between the discrete governance alterna-
tives. This allows for cruder and simpler
measurements than the absolute measurement of
transaction costs (Williamson 1985).
3.1.5 Measurement validity
Survey respondents were asked to indicate on 5-point
Likert scales how important they find the above items
in their decision to syndicate deals. The scale items
were first factor analyzed, using principle component
analysis and varimax rotation. We analyzed the
different dimensions of the scales to assess their
unidimensionality and factor structure. Items were
checked if they satisfied the following criteria: (1)
items should have communality higher than 0.3; (2)
dominant loadings should be greater than 0.5; (3)
cross-loadings should be lower than 0.3; (4) the scree
plot criterion should be satisfied (DeVellis 1991;
Briggs and Cheeck 1988). One item did not satisfy
these criteria, and this resulted in a pool of 15 items
and 4 factors (see Table 2). The reliabilities of the
dimensions of each scale were assessed by means of
the Cronbach alpha coefficient. The alphas are 0.81
(need for management resources, five items), 0.72
(need for financial resources, four items), 0.83 (deal-
flow reciprocation, two items), and 0.83 (adaptive
coordination efficiency, four items). Furthermore, all
items have correlations of 0.70 or more with their
respective constructs, which suggests satisfactory
item reliability (Hulland 1999).
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) with
EQS version 6.1 to further explore the validity of the
1 In order to make sure that our results are not driven by a
restrictive specification of the functional form, second order
terms were included. However, the second order terms were
insignificant and therefore removed from the analysis.
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scales by adding constrains to the measurement
model (Table 2). The constrained exploratory factor
analysis obtained a satisfactory fit (v2 = 112,
df = 41, p \ 0.01), root-mean-square estimated
residual [RMSEA] = 0.06, Bentler-Bonett Normed
fit index [NFI] = 0.92. The ratio of chi-square to
degrees of freedom is 2.73; a value of less than 3.0
for the ratio indicates a good fit (Carmines and
McIver 1981). A NFI value above 0.9 is considered
an indication of good fit, and the RMSEA of 0.06
indicates good model fit because it does not exceed
the critical value of 0.08 (Bentler and Bonett 1980).
Composite reliabilities are all above the 0.70
commonly used threshold value, and average vari-
ance extracted measures exceed the 0.50 value (Hair
et al. 1998). Discriminant validity of the scales was
further verified by comparing the highest shared
variance between any two constructs and the variance
extracted from each of the constructs. In all cases, the
shared variance between two constructs was far less
than the variance extracted from each of the
constructs, supporting the discriminant validity of
the measurement model (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Finally, none of the confidence intervals of the
correlation coefficients between any two constructs
contained 1.0 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Overall,
Table 1 Description of the variables and original survey items
Name Mean SE Original survey items
Syndication
frequency
2.75 1.40 Please indicate the approximate proportion of your firm’s investments that are
syndicated: (1–5)
Log size executives 1.64 0.95 How many investment executives are there in your firms?
Log size fund 4.03 2.41 What is the size of investment in your current portfolio? (millions)
Need for
management
resources
(a = 0.81)
2.57 1.13 (1) The deal is outside the industries in which you usually invest
(2) The deal is located outside of the geographical region(s) in which you usually
invest
(3) Difficulty in bringing in industry experts from outside
(4) The deal is in a foreign country (removed)
(5) The deal is outside the investment stage(s) in which you usually invest
(6) The need to access specific skills in order to manage the investment
Need for financial
resources
(a = 0.72)
3.79 0.89 (1) The large size of the deal in proportion to the size of funds available
(2) The requirement for additional rounds of financing
(3) The large size of the deal in proportion to the firm’s average deal size
(4) The large size of the deal in proportion to the largest deal previously undertaken
by your firm as a sole investment
(5) A high degree of specific risk associated with the deal
Deal-flow
reciprocation
(a = 0.83)
2.73 1.12 (1) The possibility of the future reciprocation of deals
(2) The reciprocation of past deal-flow
Adaptive
coordination
efficiency
(a = 0.83)
2.18 0.74 (1) In the management of syndicated investments, decision-making takes a longer
time than in the case of non-syndicated investments (reverse)
(2) The greater the number of members in a syndicate the more difficult it becomes
for the venture capital firms to act in a co- ordinated fashion (reverse)
(3) Co-ordinated action amongst syndicate members becomes increasingly difficult
when the investment performs badly (reverse)
(4) Co-ordinated action is much more difficult to achieve when investments are
syndicated (whether you are a syndicate lead or not) (reverse)
Early stage 0.60 0.49 Dummy variable = 1 when VC firms is willing to invest in early stage ventures, 0
otherwise
Lead 2.75 1.48 Please indicate the approximate proportion of syndicates in which your firm acts as a
LEAD member
Log firm age 1.87 1.01 How many years has your firm been in operation?
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thus, the measurement model is acceptable, given this
variety of supportive indices.
3.1.6 Control variables
We measured Early stage as a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the VC firm invests in early
stage deals, and 0 otherwise. Of the VC firms, 60% in
the sample indicated that they invest in early stage
deals. We measured Lead syndication as the approx-
imate proportion of deals (in five categories of 20%)
in which the VC firm acts as a lead member, and we
measured Firm age as the log-transformed number of
years the VC firm has been in operation.
3.1.7 Common method bias
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), common
method bias can have substantial effects on
observed relations between measures of different
constructs. To address this problem we first per-
formed Harman’s one-factor test on the self-reported
items of the latent constructs included in our study.
The hypothesis of one general factor underlying the
relationships was rejected (p \ 0.01). In addition,
we found multiple factors, and the first factor did
not account for the majority of the variance. Second,
a model fit of the measurement model of more than
0.90 (see Table 2) suggests no problems with
common method bias (Bagozzi et al. 1991). Third,
the smallest observed correlation among the model
variables can function as a proxy for common
method bias (Lindell and Brandt 2000). Table 3
shows a value of -0.01 to be the smallest corre-
lation between the model variables, which indicates
that common method bias is not a problem. Finally,
we performed a partial correlation method (Podsak-
off and Organ 1986). The highest factor between an
unrelated set of items and each predictor variable
was added to the model. These factors did not
produce a significant change in variance explained
(p [ 0.33), again suggesting no substantial common
method bias. In sum, we conclude that the evidence
from a variety of methods supports the assumption
that common method bias does not account for the
study’s results.
Table 2 Measurement
model resulting from the
constrained exploratory
factor analysis
Construct items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Need for management resources item 1 0.835
Need for management resources item 2 0.664
Need for management resources item 3 0.819
Need for management resources item 5 0.675
Need for management resources item 6 0.752
Need for financial resources item 1 0.821
Need for financial resources item 2 0.662
Need for financial resources item 3 0.849
Need for financial resources item 4 0.586
Deal-flow reciprocation item 1 0.892
Deal-flow reciprocation item 2 0.914
Adaptive coordination efficiency item 1 0.779
Adaptive coordination efficiency item 2 0.808
Adaptive coordination efficiency item 3 0.845
Adaptive coordination efficiency item 4 0.860
Composite reliability 0.87 0.83 0.90 0.89
Cronbach Alpha 0.81 0.72 0.83 0.83
Average variance extracted 0.55 0.57 0.82 0.68
v2 = 112
df = 41
p \ 0.01
NFI = 0.92
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4 Results
A description of the survey items and the variables under
study are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The need for
financial resources is the most important factor in the
decision to syndicate with a mean value of 3.79 (on a 1–5
scale). The need for management resources and deal-
flow reciprocation are on average not seen as important
factors in the decision to syndicate investment (2.57 and
2.73, respectively). Adaptive coordination efficiency of
syndicated investment is considered to be relatively low
by the respondents (mean 2.18). This strengthens our
argument that adaptive coordination efficiency should
not be neglected when studying the formation of
investment syndicates.
Table 3 shows the correlations between the vari-
ables. The size of the correlations between the
independent variables indicates no problems with
multicollinearity. In addition, variance inflation fac-
tors were calculated for the independent variables to
detect multicollinearity. The results did not indicate
any problems (VIF \ 3).
The results of the SEM model are presented in
Table 4. Because it is recommended that centered
variables be used in the SEM analysis (Williams et al.
2003), we rescaled the variables into standardized z-
scores. We estimate two path models: one with the
number of VC executives and one with the total size
of the funds under management as proxies for VC
firm size. The path coefficients of both models using
normal theory maximum likelihood estimation are
presented in Table 4.
The hypothesis tests conducted in the structural
equation modeling context assume that the data used
to test the model arise from a joint multivariate
normal distribution. The dependent variable of our
study (syndication frequency) is an ordinal (non-
normal) variable for which we assume a normal
distribution. If data are not joint multivariate normal
distributed, the chi-square test statistic of overall
model fit will be inflated, and the standard errors used
to test the significance of individual parameter
estimates will be deflated. The robust estimation
approach corrects the model fit chi-square test
statistic and standard errors of individual parameter
estimates. This approach was introduced by Satorra
and Bentler (1988) and incorporated into the EQS
program. The robust approach works by adjusting
downward the obtained model fit chi-square statistic
based on the amount of non-normality in the sample
data. The larger the multivariate kurtosis of the input
data, the stronger the applied adjustment to the chi-
square test statistic. Standard errors for parameter
estimates are adjusted upwards in much the same
manner to reduce appropriately the type 1 error rate
for individual parameter estimate tests. Although the
parameter estimate values themselves are the same as
those from a standard ML solution, the standard
errors are adjusted, with the end result being a more
appropriate hypothesis test that the parameter esti-
mate is zero in the population from which the sample
was drawn. However, comparison with the ML
solution did not indicate any significant changes. In
addition, Mardia’s kappa test suggests no problematic
Table 3 Pearson correlations and average variance extracted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Need for financial resources (1) 1
Need for management resources (2) 0.056 1
Deal-flow reciprocation (3) 0.125 0.201 1
Adaptive coordination efficiency (4) 0.066 -0.061 -0.010 1
Lead (5) 0.044 -0.072 0.032 0.013 1
Firm age (6) -0.071 0.000 0.077 -0.067 -0.072 1
Early stage (7) 0.031 0.104 -0.087 0.180 -0.079 -0.176 1
Firm size fund (8) -0.078 0.050 0.033 -0.022 -0.014 0.249 -0.043 1
Firm size executives (9) -0.133 -0.014 -0.004 0.076 0.046 0.197 -0.063 0.778 1
Syndication frequency (10) 0.121 0.125 0.097 0.221 0.165 -0.261 0.183 -0.078 -0.153 1
Average variance extracted 0.57 0.55 0.82 0.68 – – – – – –
Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are bold
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kurtosis. Thus, we conclude that the non-normality of
the ordinal data did not produce a problematic
violation of the assumption of a joint multivariate
normal distribution.
As indicated by the fit indices, both size models
show a good absolute fit (GFI = 0.96) and compar-
ative fit (CFI = 0.97–0.98; RMSEA = 0.05–0.06)
with the data. The total R-square of the models is 0.16
and 0.17, respectively. The model accounts for about
16% of the variance in syndication frequency, which
can be considered substantial considering the per-
ceptual nature of the data and the raw measurement
of the dependent variable in five categories. We
compared the different alternative specifications in
line with the procedure suggested by Anderson and
Gerbing (1988), using the Lagrange multiplier test,
and found that no alternative specification of the
parameters would have led to a model that better
represented the data.
The path coefficients from VC Firm Size ? Need
for financial resources are similar and significant which
supports hypothesis 1 that VC firm size is negatively
related to the need to gain access to financial resources
through syndicated VC investment. The path coeffi-
cient in Model II is larger and significant at a higher
level. Model I provides only weak support (p \ 0.10)
for hypothesis 1. The path coefficients in Model I and II
from VC firm size ? Need for management resources
are similar but the path coefficient is not significant in
Model II. Our hypothesis 2 that VC firm size is
negatively related to the need to gain access to
management resources through syndicated VC invest-
ment is therefore only supported with respect to VC
firm size as the size of the funds under management.
One explanation may be that the benefits of special-
ization are better captured by fund size than by the
number of executives in the firm. The path coefficients
from VC firm size ? Deal-flow reciprocation are
positive and significant (p \ 0.05) in Model I and
Model II. The results therefore provide support for
hypothesis 3 that VC firm size is positively related to
the capability for deal-flow reciprocation through
syndicated investment. The path coefficients from
VC firm size ? Adaptive coordination efficiency are
negative and significant (p \ 0.05) in Model I and
Model II. The empirical evidence therefore provides
Table 4 SEM results of the structural paths (N = 317)
Model fit/structural paths Model I
Fund size ML
Model II
Executives ML
GFI (absolute fit index) 0.96 0.96
CFI (comparative fit index) 0.98 0.97
RMSEA (absolute fit index) 0.05 0.06
90% confidence interval RMSEA 0.02 (0.08) 0.02 (0.09)
VC firm size ? need for financial resources -0.06 (0.03) -0.17*
VC firm size ? need for management resources -0.05 (0.03)* -0.06ns
VC firm size ? deal-flow reciprocation 0.08 (0.03)* 0.15 (0.07)*
VC firm size ? adaptive coordination efficiency -0.06 (0.03)* -0.11*
VC firm size ? lead 0.07 (0.05) 0.12 (0.10)
VC firm size ? early stage -0.08 (0.01)** -0.17**
Need for financial resources ? syndication frequency 0.14 (0.06)* 0.14 (0.06)*
Need for management resources ? syndication frequency 0.16 (0.06)* 0.17 (0.06)*
Deal-flow reciprocation ? syndication frequency 0.15 (0.06)* 0.14 (0.06)*
Adaptive coordination efficiency ? syndication frequency 0.14 (0.06)* 0.16 (0.07)*
Lead syndication ? syndication frequency 0.10 (0.04)* 0.14 (0.04)*
VC firm age ? syndication frequency -0.18 (0.07)* -0.14*
Early stage ? syndication frequency 0.30 (0.13)* 0.26 (0.13)*
Size ? syndication frequency 0.09 (0.06)ns 0.41 (0.19)*
Model R-square: 0.16*** Model R-square: 0.17***
 p \ 0.10, * p \ 0.05, ** p \ 0.01
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support for hypothesis 4 that VC firm size of the focal
firm is negatively related to the adaptive coordination
efficiency of a syndicated investment.
The paths of all control variables are significant and
in line with expectations. Large firms are more likely to
have a lead role, be older, and invest in later stage deals.
However, the path coefficient Size ? Lead syndica-
tion is surprisingly small and only significant at the
10% level. This indicates that small VC firms also
frequently act as lead in syndicated investments.
Further, the direct effect of firm size is still substantial
in the number of executives model. The significance of
the second order term and the improved fit of the model
indicate that the relationship is curvilinear. These
results indicate that either fund size better captures firm
size effects or that firm size effects play a role beyond
the hypothesized mediating effects of resources access
needs and capabilities.
5 Discussion
Our study is the first to explore simultaneous
opposing mediation effects of resource access needs
and resources access capabilities on firm size effects
in the relationship between firm size hybrid gover-
nance. Building on arguments from the extended
resource-based view (Lavie 2006), transaction costs
economics (Williamson 1985), and consistent with
insights from the alliance literature (e.g., Podolny
1994; Stuart 2000), we developed the argument that
small firms have a higher need to gain access to
external complementary resources, whereas large
firms have a better capability to gain access to
reciprocal deal-flow and face higher transaction costs
of adaptive coordination in hybrid governance
arrangements.
The empirical evidence, based on survey data from
executives in the VC industry, supports our theoretical
framework. We found that VC firm size has opposing
effects on the resource access needs and capabilities of
syndicated investment, and these factors in turn
determine the level of syndication frequency.
The capability for resource access is not always
positively driven by the small size of the firm. Our
theoretical model, which we empirically validate,
suggests that large firms have an advantage in
syndication for reasons that relate to the capability
to be invited to future deal-flow; however, we show
that small firms also have a capability advantage in
adaptive coordination of syndicated investment. This
is an interesting finding and one that enables us to
develop a more nuanced understanding of the trade-
offs that size imposes on the capability to gain access
to resources through cooperative behavior.
We attach particular importance to the role that
network-based assets play in shaping the syndication
needs and capabilities of different size of VC firms.
Our consideration of network-based assets highlights
that syndication between VC firms is not a one-off
event, but likely involves repeated syndication of
different investments over time. Network positions
affect syndication behavior through two main mech-
anisms. From an RBV perspective, large firms are
more motivated to syndicate for deal-flow reasons
because their central network position means that
they are more likely to be invited into future
syndicates. Therefore, the expectation of reciprocated
deal-flow is greater for large firms. From a TCE
perspective, the larger a VC firm, the greater the
potential network damage it may incur through
syndication, and hence the greater its transaction
costs when syndicating. Firms, therefore, face an
important size-imposed trade-off when assessing the
upside and downside of network effects in syndica-
tion. This analysis demonstrates that in order to
explain a complex phenomenon such as syndication
behavior, it is necessary to move beyond a single
theory approach to model building. Single theory
approaches may be unsuitable for studying complex
phenomena (see Gray and Wood 1991). By bringing
together insights from both the RBV and TCE we are
able to better understand the trade-offs VC firms
make when deciding on their syndication strategy.
The results of this study have important managerial
implications. The need to access different resources
influences the syndication behavior of VC firms, which
in turn is influenced by the size of the firm. For small
firms the benefits of syndication are greater for financial
resources and managerial expertise resources, and they
are more efficient in coordinating VC investment.
However, they are less likely to be invited into future
deals. Small VC firms should hence develop an explicit
syndication strategy for developing resources that make
them more attractive as syndicate partners. Given that
small VC firms are less likely to be invited in syndicates,
they need to actively build ties with other, well-respected
VC firms and offer them specific advantages. They
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might, for example, invest heavily in alternative ways of
deal-flow generation, enabling them to spot interesting
proposals early and hence to invite colleagues in a
valuable investment proposal, hoping their more central
network position will lead to deal reciprocation in the
future. Further, they might build specific resources or
capabilities, e.g., industry knowledge and innovation,
that makes them more attractive to syndicate partners.
For example, small firms may be in a better position to
create entrepreneurial rents from its available resources.
Large firms may, for example, suffer from core
rigidities, reduced experimentation, and lower incentive
intensity (Mosakowski 2002). Particularly in innovative
contexts such as early stage VC investments, such
features can become critical, and large VC syndicate
partners may need small VC firms for providing support
in entrepreneurial processes such as product innovation
and new business formation. This may especially be the
case where large firms face rapidly changing technology
and knowledge environments with short product life
cycles that make rapid dissemination of information
necessary. These specific skills and resources may help
to reduce their liabilities of smallness.
The finding of a negative association between the
adaptive coordination efficiency of syndication and
VC firm size has practical implications in the context
of the recent development of club (i.e., syndicated)
deals at the larger buy-out end of the market
(Cumming et al. 2007). Club deals have been
undertaken to enable large deals to be consummated
that would otherwise be too risky for single VCs. In
addition to this risk-spreading rationale, club deals
may bring together the diverse specialist skills
required to restructure and regenerate a particular
deal. However, coordination may be problematical
when restructuring of distressed buyouts is required.
Since all large funds are likely to have extensive
market expertise in order to be able to raise large
funds, coordination problems may be exacerbated if
the executives from each syndicate partner have
strong view about how restructuring should be
effected. The implication is that large VC firms need
to exercise considerable due diligence in selecting
syndicate partners if they are to protect their network
positions. This issue assumes particular importance
given the recent negative criticism of the behavior of
large VC firms (Treasury Select Committee 2007).
Next to further study of trade-off effects of firm size
on resource access needs and resource access
capabilities through syndication, future research could
further validate and extend this study along several
dimensions. For example, the results of this study
depend on the perceptions and observations of one VC
executive in a VC firm. Future research could cross-
validate the perceptions of several executives within
one firm in order to assess the impact of single
respondent bias. A further potential limitation is that
the data could be subjected to measurement context
effects, which refers to any artifactual covariation
produced from the context in which measures are
obtained independent of the content of the construct
themselves (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This bias is caused
by the fact that both the predictor and criterion variable
are measured at the same point in time using the same
medium. To overcome the problem of common context
bias, one might try to obtain the data for the predictor
variable from an external source. Unfortunately, this
was not possible for this study because we have no link
between the names of the respondents and the response
file and a recommendation for future research would be
to gather data from different external sources.
Another limitation of this study is that we did not
analyze longitudinal effects. Past syndication behavior
may influence the future needs and capabilities to
syndicate. For example, small VC firms may gain
status by being associated with large reputable and
well-connected firms in VC syndication. In addition,
advanced screening and monitoring of small syndica-
tion partners by reputable and well-connected firms
may improve the status of small VC firms in future
deals. Future research could explore the long-term
effects of syndicated investment on the resource access
needs and capabilities of small and large VC firms. We
hope that future research will use the ideas presented in
this paper and develop knowledge that will help small
and large firms to maximize firm value from external
resources through hybrid governance arrangements.
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